
Turkey is pursuing an increasingly dangerous bid to reshape the balance of power in the Middle Easter. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Ankara has combined support for Islamists, military intervention and economic leverage to expand Turkish influence across the region and beyond, challenging the existing geopolitical order.
Turkey’s dramatic departure from its “zero problems with neighbours” doctrine began around 2011, when the Arab Spring opened a new geopolitical opportunity for Erdogan. Ankara increasingly backed Islamist movements, including Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, then an al-Qaida affiliate led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. Erdogan’s support helped propel al-Sharaa from an al-Qaida commander into Syria’s president, making Turkey one of his most important external backers.
In 2012, while working for CNN in Egypt, I witnessed Erdogan’s arrival in Cairo as he exited the airport, where he was greeted by hundreds of ecstatic Muslim Brotherhood supporters carrying banners and chanting, “Erdogan and the Brotherhood are one hand.” At the time, the question was whether Erdogan was simply courting the Brotherhood, which had just come to power in Egypt, or whether Turkey was embarking on a far more ambitious strategy: using Islamist movements as instruments of Turkish influence and expanding Ankara’s political and strategic reach across the region. The events that followed suggest it was the latter.
After recognizing Libya’s National Transitional Council following Moammar Gadhafi’s ouster in 2011, Erdogan’s government provided it with $300 million in credit and, along with Qatar, backed several Islamist factions in that country’s civil war.
During my reporting in Libya, I met Islamist political figures and fighters who had been funded and trained by Turkish forces, giving me a firsthand view of Ankara’s growing role in the conflict. In 2012, Libya’s Muslim Brotherhood established the Justice and Construction Party, which has been supported by Ankara — illustrating Turkey’s emerging strategy of using Islamist partnerships to expand its regional influence
When Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization in 2013-14, Turkey continued providing political and financial support, hosting Brotherhood-affiliated media and members wanted by Arab governments. This cemented Turkey’s role as a key Brotherhood hub and further strained ties with its Arab neighbours.
A recent Foundation for Defense of Democracies research memo — titled, “Islamist Turkey: A Forward Base for Muslim Brotherhood-Aligned Jihadism” — argues that under Erdogan, Turkey has moved further from its traditional western alignment toward Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. Since 2011, Hamas has expanded its presence in Turkey, establishing offices and networks that have allowed it to operate from Turkish territory.
Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood also extends into Syria, where Ankara has backed Brotherhood-linked political and Islamist forces while expanding its strategic footprint. The two countries share a roughly 900-kilometre border, and Turkey’s estimated 49 army bases and more than 100 military sites and observation posts in Syria, backed by over 10,000 troops, give Ankara a powerful platform to project influence into Iraq, Lebanon and the wider region.
Erdogan’s strategy extends beyond Islamist alliances, combining political influence, military power, economic leverage and diplomatic reach. The clearest recent example is the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, a trilateral mutual-defence pact signed by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan on Aug. 7. The agreement establishes a collective-security framework similar to NATO’s Article 5, treating an armed attack on any one member as an attack on all three. Its inaugural committee meeting began in Istanbul on Monday.
I spoke this week with Sinan Ciddi, a senior fellow and Turkey program director at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington, D.C.-based nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy. He believes Erdogan will seek to expand the pact’s membership.
“Turkey’s alliance-building initiatives should not be viewed in isolation. The Mecca Pact is one component of Erdogan’s broader vision of positioning Turkey as a ‘global actor.’ The pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is a significant building block in his effort to co-ordinate the trade, energy and diplomatic interests of Sunni powers. Over time, he will seek to expand its membership,” Ciddi said.
“At the same time, Ankara is building robust bilateral partnerships across Africa while positioning itself to the European Union as a security bulwark against Russia. In the Mediterranean, Turkey is pushing to redefine maritime boundaries to its advantage, in concert with partners such as Libya, raising alarm in Greece, Israel and Cyprus. None of Erdogan’s initiatives is short-term or isolated; they are part of a broader strategy to increase Turkey’s geopolitical visibility and influence.”
Turkey’s relationship with Israel is perhaps best described as a dramatic strategic reversal. The two countries were once close security partners, sharing intelligence and co-operating militarily. Today, relations have reached a historic low, with Ankara and Jerusalem increasingly treating each other as regional rivals. The question is no longer whether their relationship can return to the way it was, but how far this confrontation will go.
Erdogan has increasingly positioned Israel as a strategic adversary. Addressing the Turkish parliament in 2023, he issued an unusually direct warning to Israel, targeting both its leadership and nuclear capabilities: “Hey Israel, you have an atomic bomb, a nuclear bomb. And you are making threats with this. We know this. And your end is near,” he declared , adding, “you’re on your way out.”
Such rhetoric reflects the broader deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations and Erdogan’s effort to position Turkey as a leading political and strategic counterweight to Israel in the region.
On Aug. 18, Israel sent a direct warning to Turkey by striking the Abu al-Duhur airbase in Idlib, near the Turkish border, as Turkey was reportedly preparing to deploy troops and reactivate the base. The message to Ankara was clear: Israel will not tolerate a Turkish military presence that threatens its strategic interests. The strikes signal a growing contest between Ankara and Jerusalem over who will shape the emerging regional order in Syria.
“Ankara’s rebuttal is that its presence in Syria is lawful because Damascus consents, while Israel’s is not, but Turkey has seldom waited for permission when it entered Syria. It launched three major cross-border operations — Euphrates Shield in 2016, Olive Branch against Afrin in 2018 and Peace Spring across Ras al-Ain and Tell Abyad in 2019 — each justified by Ankara as self-defence against terrorism, each conducted over Damascus’s explicit objection,” said Ciddi.
“It armed and paid Islamist and jihadist militias throughout the war. It still effectively controls swaths of the north and continues paying the salaries of former Syrian National Army factions now folded into the new Syrian military — factions documented as detaining, extorting and abusing civilians.”
Turkey’s expanding military footprint and its growing ties to Islamist and Iran-aligned actors are increasingly bringing Ankara into direct competition with Israel. What was once a largely co-operative relationship has evolved into a broader struggle over influence and security across the Middle East. When Turkey offered troops for a postwar International Stabilization Force in Gaza, Israel rejected the proposal.
During my current reporting from Lebanon, I have seen that Iran-backed Hezbollah militants continue fighting against Israeli forces despite ongoing peace talks, underscoring the importance of UNIFIL as its mandate nears expiration. Erdogan’s bid for a security role in southern Lebanon is therefore likely to face Israeli resistance, as Jerusalem increasingly views a Turkish military presence on its northern border as a strategic threat.
Turkey’s ambitions are bringing Ankara into increasingly direct conflict with Israel. As both sides strengthen their military positions and enforce competing red lines, the risk is no longer merely diplomatic — it’s the possibility of a direct military confrontation between two increasingly assertive regional powers.
National Post
Mohamed Fahmy is an award-winning journalist who has covered the Middle East for numerous outlets, including CNN, Al-Jazeera, the Los Angeles Times and Foreign Policy.

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