The new Greenland–Denmark–United States agreement may tell us more about the future of North American defence than all of U.S. President Donald Trump’s threats and rhetoric surrounding it.
At first glance, it looks like a major assertion of American power in Greenland and perhaps a victory for Trump’s pressure tactics. A closer look suggests something rather different: The United States has largely secured the same military rights it already possessed under the 1951 defence agreement with Denmark.
There are at least two important differences from 1951.
The first is the new restriction barring states or investors which are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or NATO partners or European Union members from controlling, significantly influencing or accessing non-public information unless the parties are that the “activities of such states or investors would not constitute a threat to national security or public order.” It states that the reasoning for this restriction is the “threat to national security and public order posed by increased efforts by adversaries to expand influence and control in Greenland.” Which suggests that unless parties agree, Russia and China will not likely be able to establish a direct investment presence in Greenland.
The second is the role of the Greenlandic government itself. Greenland is now directly involved in the agreement and the possibility of independence is explicitly recognized in its preamble. Neither was the case in 1951. Indeed, no one was seriously talking about an independent Greenland at the time. The political circumstances have, therefore, changed considerably, even though the basic American military presence remains.
What has not changed is equally important. Under the 1951 agreement, the U.S. already had extensive military rights in Greenland and were using them for some very sensitive missions. American aircraft armed with nuclear weapons flew over and around Greenland during the Cold War. We know this for certain because of the 1968 crash of a B-52 approximately eleven kilometres outside Thule, now Pituffik. The aircraft was conducting an overflight associated with the base’s ballistic missile early warning system and was carrying four nuclear weapons. The incident demonstrated just how extensive the American military presence in Greenland already was under the 1951 agreement.
The important point is that Trump has not really obtained something the United States did not already have. The Americans have largely reaffirmed their existing security arrangements. What Trump’s actions have done is seriously damage American relations, specifically, trust with both Denmark and Greenland. That is a considerable political cost when the substantive military gains appear relatively limited.
There is an important lesson here for Canada. The Greenland agreement suggests that it may still be possible to reach a reasonable defence arrangement with the U.S. despite the noise, threats and belligerent posturing coming from Washington. Political relations may be extremely difficult, but practical defence co-operation remains possible when the strategic requirements are clear. The agreement is a reminder that the U.S. still has to work with its Arctic partners, despite the bellicose rhetoric coming from the White House.
That matters because Canada is becoming more important to the defence of North America, not less. Canada has committed to working with the United States through the North American Aerospace Defense Command up until now and has previously indicated that it was interested in co-operating on the emerging Golden Dome missile-defence system . Yet the Trump administration’s actions have made co-operation much more difficult politically. This is the central dilemma: the U.S. is becoming a more difficult partner at precisely the time when it will increasingly need Canada.
The American effort to improve missile defence capabilities in Greenland will reinforce that requirement. Greenland provides an important position for missile warning and defence, but it cannot, by itself, provide the U.S. with what it needs to defend North America. Even as the U.S. expands capabilities in Greenland, Washington will inevitably have to look again to Canada. Canadian territory, sensors, communications, infrastructure and access to the Canadian Arctic will become increasingly important to any comprehensive continental missile defence system.
The Greenland agreement therefore offers an important lesson for Ottawa. The Americans are going to need Canada. The challenge for Ottawa will be to manage that relationship without allowing the ongoing political confrontation to undermine the practical defence co-operation that both countries have enjoyed up until now and still require.
The Greenland agreement demonstrates that such an arrangement is still possible. It recognizes Greenland’s changing political circumstances while protecting long-standing American defence requirements. As the U.S. strengthens its missile defence capabilities in Greenland, it will come back to Canada for many of the capabilities it will need to complete the defence of North America. Trump may have made that relationship much harder politically, but he has not changed the geography of the continent or the underlying strategic requirements of North American defence.
Macdonald-Laurier Institute senior fellow Rob Huebert is a professor of political science at the University of Calgary and director of its Centre for Military, Security, and Strategic Studies.
National Post
