There is a move afoot in the Senate of all places to capitalize on the sense of outrage over the fact that Julie Payette will be collecting her pension and other annuities in spite of her early resignation at the conclusion of the workplace investigation that found her to be at the centre of a toxic work environment. While there is justifiable outrage over this fact, and nobody wants to see Payette rewarded for her behaviour, it needs to be reiterated that going after her pension and benefits is a very poor idea, and will only cause a lot of trouble and litigation if Senator Claude Carignan's Senate public bill moves ahead.
There is a legal aphorism that poor facts make poor case law, and this is such a case where it very much applies. Payette's situation has been unique in the annals of vice-regal history in this country, and trying to build laws around future instances of abuse are less constructive than doing proper vetting of candidates in the first place, particularly given that there will be much greater scrutiny on that aspect in the years to come. But even this aside, there are deeper and more fundamental considerations at play that senators in particular should be sensitive to, given the long history of members of that chamber resigning before they could be removed in order to preserve their own pensions and benefits.
One of the big reasons that we enshrine the salaries and pensions of senior officials in legislation is to help preserve their independence if the government of the day threatens the salary and pension of the GG, senators, or Supreme Court judges, because they are standing in the way of something the government wants to do, it can't be done on a whim. What Carignan is doing with this bill is an attack on institutional independence (which, as a senator, he should guard jealously rather than falling for this populist noise), especially because it creates a precedent for having a chilling effect on anyone else who has these kinds of legislated salaries and pension benefits.
The bill, should it become law, would be a lawsuit waiting to happen, because it goes against the both fundamental principle that legislation shouldn't target an individual, as well as established case law where other Governor-in-Council at-pleasure appointees who have been forced to leave their positions prior to their terms being up have been able to recover their expected salaries. It also, based on the news reports (it has not yet been tabled), would peg the bill to any non-medical resignation before the end of a five-year mandate a mandate that doesn't actually exit in law. Governors general have served varying terms, and while five years is a reasonable average length of their terms in office, it is not binding, and we have seen some go well past seven years, others have been under that five-year mark for various reasons. Tying the five-years in this kind of legislation is poor form all around. As well, there can be many legitimate, non-medical reasons for resignation, and this presupposes that there cannot be.
It should also be pointed out that this bill is also coming at a time where a Bloc MP has also tabled a bill that would reduce the GG's salary to $1 per year, and eliminate the pension and other annuities entirely, calling it a "symbolic salary for a symbolic position" something that not only betrays a complete lack of understanding of the constitutional role, but which also would limit the pool of those who could take on such a position to those who are already independently wealthy, which isn't necessarily the best outcome for society at large. (The NDP have made previous suggestions about the Senate as well, saying that they should be volunteers, as though that would somehow make them even more in touch with Canadians).
The irony of this, however, is that pensions were created for governors general and their spouses in the late 1960s, not long after our sovereign stopped naming British aristocrats to the position, either the Queen or King of the UK, and later as the King or Queen of Canada. It went along with Canadianizing the institution, and ensuring that the former holders of the office and most especially their widows could maintain some level of dignity in retirement, given the office that they held. It was certainly noted that former GG Jules Léger and his wife could not afford to live off the vice-regal's salary and pension at the time, because they didn't have money of their own when Léger was appointed, so these particular changes to salaries and benefits can be seen as a way of allowing greater participation in the role.
While there are conversations that could be had about the other post-retirement benefits that were later additions, designed to allow former governors general support for any activities that are carrying on related to their time in office things such as correspondence, any charity patronages, and so on as well as support for an initiative or foundation that they are starting up as part of their legacy of their time in office, we should beware falling into our usual Canadian habits of hairshirt parsimony. Yes, we can and should demand more transparency around those expenses, which seems to be happening now, but killing those programs for the sake of killing them is poor form.
While I get that Carignan is trying to capitalize on the populist anger toward Payette, I would humbly suggest that he let his bill die on the Order Paper, having fulfilled its symbolic purpose. No good can come of this bill, and we need to get over our petty cheapness and consider Payette's pension as the price paid for her walking away from the post quietly and not causing a constitutional crisis or needing to involve the Queen in securing her dismissal. There is no reasonable justification for letting this kind of legislation proceed, lest he want to open a can of worms and cost the government millions of dollars in litigation fees because he couldn't resist the urge to showboat.
Photo Credit: CBC News