If you haven't been following the shenanigans of the Manitoba NDP the past few months, then it's time you take a second look, because it's a preview of what we can expect if Michael Chong's Reform Act passes. In fact, it's an object lesson as to why the system that the bill proposes to implement is an unmitigated disaster for parliamentary democracy.
To recap: Premier Greg Selinger raised the provincial sales tax and the party's polling numbers plummeted. This, along with what has been reported as an air of disinterest in what his cabinet or caucus had to say led to a revolt where five cabinet ministers resigned in protest. But rather than take the hint that he should leave for the good of the party, Selinger decided to stay put and launched a leadership contest but he was running and staying on as premier during it. In the end, he won the leadership by some 33 delegated votes (with some 200 delegates not voting on the second ballot), leaving a party full of cracks that are out in the open.
With Selinger having been given a renewed mandate from the party's membership and the designated labour union votes that the contest allowed, it has set up an untenable situation going forward. Clearly, Selinger is facing a divided caucus that doesn't have full confidence in his ability to lead, and that's a very bad thing in a parliamentary system. What's worse is that his caucus the people elected to represent their constituents can no longer have any sway over the leader because his position has been decided and cemented by those outside of caucus, who don't have to deal with him on a daily basis. The extra-parliamentary party has overcome the parliamentary party, and these MLAs have no choice but to suck it up and live with it, or else they must resign or cross the floor. This can't be an ideal situation by any stretch of the imagination.
If this all sounds like a complete gong show to you, then just think about how Michael Chong's Reform Act will make situations like this the legislated norm at the federal level. If and it's a big if 20 percent of a caucus can get enough of a backbone to trigger a secret vote on the leader, and if they can get enough votes to trigger that leadership review, then we may very well find ourselves in this very same situation. While it does stipulate that caucus must elect an interim leader while the party elects a new leader, there is nothing to say that the ousted leader can't run to return to his or her old job. It's certainly not inconceivable that a charismatic enough of a leader can win the grassroots support despite having alienated the majority of caucus, much as Selinger has done. And then what?
A Reform Act situation with a sitting prime minister would be an even bigger mess with needing to choose an interim leader who would have to be sworn in as prime minister for the duration of the leadership contest, which is going to be no small headache, particularly if he or she needs to engage in a cabinet shuffle to accommodate those ministers who are also running for the leadership. It would also likely necessitate a confidence vote of the Commons, and quite probably a new Throne Speech as well after all, the chamber granted confidence to a previous prime minister and ministry, who had his or her own program. A new prime minister, however much the job is intended to be temporary, would need to face those tests if his or her government was to be legitimate. Will the government's legislative agenda be put on hold for the six or nine months that a leadership contest would be expected to take? Would the government have to basically coast for that duration, or would the new prime minister try to implement his or her own agenda without a real mandate to do so? What about any kind of budget that would need to come down during that period? Remember that the parliamentary calendar is already pretty short when it comes to providing time for an agenda to be implemented. Should the people of Canada have to deal with legislative stasis because we've made it effectively impossible to properly turf a leaders who no longer enjoys the confidence of his or her own caucus?
More to the point, how can this kind of a move be seen as a way of empowering MPs when it explicitly keeps their power over leadership selection in the hands of a party grassroots that may wind up being hostile to the interests of caucus, as we've just witnessed in Manitoba. The leader is not beholden to those MPs/MLAs, and will let them know it if they challenge him or her. In fact, we have no way of knowing that a re-elected leader won't be willing to punish opponents who either triggered the review vote in the first place, or those who supported other leadership candidates. The more we attempt to presidentialize our leadership process, the worse things are for the MPs themselves, and it can't be reiterated enough the Reform Act will entrench these changes that are hostile to our system of parliamentary democracy in statute, where they will be nearly impossible to change in the future.
The Selinger example essentially says that caucus doesn't matter. It provides further proof that if we want to return to a system in Canada where leaders are accountable, then we need to restore the tradition of caucus selecting the leader. It's the only way to fully empower MPs, and to make our system of representative democracy mean something, ensuring that our party leaders are not de facto presidents without the associated checks and balances that the American system has. We can't tolerate half measures that will only serve to doom our system of governance.
